COCOUNSEL

COCOUNSEL

Skill: Draft

Result created: 05/19/2026

Prompt: Draft a New Jersey Appellate Division reply brief responding to the arguments raised in the three attached opposition briefs (Schaifer brief and appendix; Goldberg brief and appendix; intervenor brief). The reply brief must: – Be written in formal NJ appellate brief style and formatted with standard headings (e.g., Preliminary Statement, Procedural History/Statement of Facts as needed for reply, Legal Argument with point headings, Conclusion). – Directly rebut and organize responses to the key arguments made by each opposing brief; consolidate overlapping issues and address intervenor-specific points. – Include appropriate New Jersey case citations and other controlling authority (NJ Supreme Court/Appellate Division, relevant statutes/rules) supporting the appellant’s position; use accurate Bluebook-style citations as typically used in NJ appellate practice. – Use record/appendix citations where possible based on the attached appendices; if exact page cites cannot be confirmed, use placeholders like “(App. )” and “(Pa)” consistently. – Maintain a persuasive, professional tone; avoid raising new issues; emphasize standards of review and preservation. – Not exceed 15 pages in typical double-spaced brief formatting.

Assume this is a reply brief for the appellant. Where the opposition briefs rely on facts outside the record or misstate the record, point that out. Where they argue waiver, mootness, or jurisdictional defects, respond.

Output a complete, filing-ready reply brief text.

Files:

• 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF
• 20260420_Inteervenor Brief byck.PDF
• 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

Result:

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3646-24-T1

DENNIS E. BLOCK, ESQUIRE, P.C.; DENNIS E. BLOCK, ESQUIRE, INDIVIDUALLY; AND DENNIS E. BLOCK, ESQUIRE, P.C., DERIVATIVELY ON BEHALF OF ALAN F. SAVITZ, ESQUIRE, LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

JORDAN B. GOLDBERG, ESQUIRE; GOLDBERG & WOLF, LLC; RICHARD M. SCHLAIFER, ESQUIRE; AND EARP COHN, P.C.,

Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF

Preliminary Statement

Respondents’ briefs confirm the core errors warranting reversal. First, the trial court granted summary judgment on an incomplete and constrained record, while crediting defense characterizations over reasonable inferences for the non-movant; second, it improperly converted dispositive motions and restricted discovery to a sliver of issues, then faulted Appellants for the very gaps those restrictions created; and third, it improperly treated serious record disputes—including attorney role, client identity, and control over disputed funds—as immaterial or waived.

The Goldberg brief largely rests on the proposition that opposing counsel owes no duty to adverse parties and that any alleged RPC issues are not independently actionable. But the ruling below did not turn on an RPC-only theory; it turned on disputed facts concerning who represented the entity (AFS, LLC/Savitz 2010) at critical junctures, what directions were given regarding escrow and safekeeping, what role counsel played in transfers and control of assets, and whether Appellants’ derivative posture supplied standing. Those disputes could not be resolved against Appellants on summary judgment, particularly after the court itself narrowed discovery to the attorney-client identity issue while the case was in flux.

The Schlaifer brief similarly recasts merits disputes as settled: it contends the “overwhelming record” forecloses any attorney-client relationship with Savitz 2010 and that the single January 2020 check from the old firm’s account was an “errant” payment later reimbursed. But Appellants pointed to contrary evidence and reasonable inferences—engagement scope and course of conduct, payment sources, and counsel’s roles during transition and litigation—warranting discovery and precluding judgment as a matter of law. And the intervenor Byck’s defense of the subpoena quash order only underscores how discovery was shut down at the outset on issues later deemed “threshold,” further prejudicing Appellants.

This Court should reverse the summary judgments, vacate the discovery restrictions, and remand for full, proportionate discovery and adjudication on a complete record.

Procedural History / Statement of Facts (Reply Focus)

• The trial court converted Goldberg’s motion to dismiss to summary judgment early, then granted summary judgment to Goldberg on December 1, 2023, after refusing to consider Appellants’ timely-submitted factual materials in full and treating the expert proffer as untimely or net opinion while record disputes persisted (App. ; 3T). Following that dismissal, the court granted summary judgment to the Schlaifer defendants on February 20, 2024, later vacating in part on reconsideration to allow limited discovery solely on whether the Schlaifer defendants represented “Savitz 2010,” but reaffirming dismissal of other claims and defenses and setting tight case management constraints. ^{[1] [2] [3]}
• Appellants’ subpoenas to Byck and Savitz 2019 for financial and transition records were quashed at the outset on September 12, 2023, limiting access to documents central to client identity, asset control, and counsel’s roles during the disputed period (App. ___). Intervenor acknowledges the quash rested on burden/relevance grounds and on arbitrator-imposed limitations from a separate proceeding, and emphasizes heightened scrutiny for nonparty subpoenas. ^{[4] [5]}
• As to the Schlaifer defendants, respondents assert no attorney-client relationship with Savitz 2010, relying on a 2019 engagement letter to individuals for forming Savitz Law, LLC and characterizing a January 7, 2020 check drawn on Savitz 2010’s account to Earp Cohn as a bookkeeping error later “reimbursed” by an August 12, 2023 check, with the billing attorney never seeing the payment and the firm’s receptionist/accounting routing checks (Pa_; App. _). Respondents’ brief concedes the attorney-client-identity issue drove the court’s limited discovery order and later summary judgment; they also acknowledge the reimbursement check copy variations were the subject of deposition explanations tied to office copier practices, presented only after the constrained discovery period began. ^{[6] [7] [8]}
• As to Goldberg, respondents contend they first appeared June 8, 2020, after the alleged June 2019 transfer, and that no court order required escrow or safekeeping of funds, citing Appellants’ purported concession at argument (3T18:18-21) (App. ___). Goldberg argues the trial court found any alleged RPC issues are not independently actionable and therefore dismissed all claims (including derivative ones) against opposing counsel. ^{[9] [10]}

Standards of Review

• Summary judgment is reviewed de novo; the question is whether, viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-movant, a rational factfinder could find for that party. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
• Discovery management orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion; but restrictions that materially impede a party’s ability to develop claims or defenses, or that rest on misapprehension of law, warrant reversal. Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011).

Legal Argument

POINT I Respondents’ “no-duty-to-nonclients” premise does not resolve disputed attorney-client identity, control of client property, or derivative standing issues; those fact disputes precluded summary judgment and were exacerbated by improper discovery curbs.

1. Disputed attorney-client identity, engagement scope, and course of dealing should not have been resolved on a paper record.

• The Schlaifer brief claims an “overwhelming” record of no engagement with Savitz 2010, pointing to an individualized engagement letter and after-the-fact reimbursement of a January 2020 payment (Pa___). Yet respondents also acknowledge that the trial court vacated its initial grant and reopened discovery solely on “whether there was an attorney-client relationship between the Schlaifer Defendants and Savitz 2010,” recognizing material disputes meriting development. ^[11] Disputed client identity cannot be short-circuited when the course of performance, who paid, who received advice, and who controlled legal strategy during transition all bear on the issue. See Garcia v. Kozlov, Seaton, Romanini & Brooks, P.C., 179 N.J. 343, 358-59 (2004) (relationship may be shown by conduct). Respondents’ insistence that a single “errant” check is immaterial presents a classic jury issue about weight and inference, not a basis for judgment as a matter of law.
• As to Goldberg, the “we first appeared in June 2020” assertion does not eliminate factual disputes regarding safekeeping and control of client assets during litigation, representations made about escrow or trust, and whether instructions issued by the court or parties were followed. Goldberg’s brief relies on an excerpt (3T18:18-21) to claim Appellants conceded the absence of any escrow directive; but the same record reflects Appellants’ position that funds and files were to be safeguarded pending dispute resolution and that counsel’s conduct frustrated that objective. ^{[12] [13] [14]} On summary judgment, those disputes could not be resolved against Appellants—particularly after discovery was curtailed and the record left incomplete.

1. Derivative posture and entity harm supply standing that is not defeated by respondents’ engagement-label arguments.

• Appellants pleaded claims derivatively on behalf of AFS, LLC. Respondents cite Schulman v. Wolff & Samson, P.C., 401 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 2008), to argue individual members cannot sue corporate counsel and that New Jersey has not definitively recognized derivative malpractice claims. Even the Schlaifer brief acknowledges Schulman did not bar derivative claims as a category; it reversed a dismissal that had rested on an inapposite authority and expressly declined to resolve the broader question. ^[15] That is not a basis to foreclose discovery or judgment here where Appellants alleged entity injury and sought to enforce duties owed to the entity by counsel who acted for it during transition and litigation. Any RULLCA demand/futility particulars are pleading and proof matters for development on a full record, not an anchor for early judgment.

1. Respondents’ “RPC-only” framing is a strawman; Appellants’ claims sound in common-law duties to clients and entities, not bare rule violations.

• It is correct that an RPC violation is not itself a cause of action. Baxt v. Liloia, 155 N.J. 190, 201 (1998). But Appellants do not sue “for RPC violations”; they rely on the same facts as evidence of duty, breach, causation, and damages (malpractice, fiduciary breach, conversion, and related torts), including duties to properly identify the client, avoid conflicts displacing an existing client, and safeguard client property. Respondents repeatedly admit the trial court treated the Harvey and Cobb submissions as net opinions or untimely, then leaned on that exclusion to hold the record “” ^{[16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21]} That approach is inverted: expert disputes and factual conflicts—what was paid, by whom, why; whose files/funds were controlled; what was promised to the tribunal—are precisely why summary judgment was improper.

POINT II The trial court’s discovery restrictions—early subpoena quash orders, conversion to summary judgment, and later one-issue limits—materially prejudiced Appellants; respondents’ defenses only highlight the need for reversal and remand.

1. The initial quash orders shut down core third-party discovery; the intervenor’s defense underscores the prejudice.

• Intervenor concedes the subpoena sought financial and transition materials from nonparties and was quashed pre-answer, invoking Rule 4:10-3 protection and arbitrator limits from a separate proceeding (Ia_; T1_). He also emphasizes heightened scrutiny for nonparty burden and timing concerns, and confirms the court granted the motion to quash while denying a broader protective order. ^{[22] [23] [24]} That ruling foreclosed early access to the very materials later deemed “threshold” to the case—client identity, who paid, who directed, and how assets were moved—then respondents invoked those gaps to secure judgment. That is an abuse of discretion where discovery was neither cumulative nor oppressive relative to the issues at stake in entity representation and transition.

1. Constraining discovery to a single “attorney-client identity” issue, while maintaining dispositive deadlines, compounded the error.

• The Schlaifer brief confirms the court limited discovery to attorney-client identity, set compressed deadlines, and then granted summary judgment, faulting Appellants for not deposing additional witnesses in time (Pa611-617; 7T___). Respondents admit Appellants renewed targeted written discovery and a subpoena but withdrew after motion practice amidst those limits; they further acknowledge key deposition explanations (e.g., copier “security feature” for the reimbursement-check copy) emerged only late in the constrained window. ^{[25] [26] [27]} Such sequencing—curbing breadth, compressing timing, then crediting defense testimony while discounting Appellants’ expert and inferences—reflects an unfair process. See Rivers v. LSC P’ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 80 (App. Div. 2005) (discovery discretion cannot rest on misapprehension of necessity or effect).

1. The plain-error refrain cannot salvage discovery errors that shaped the merits rulings.

• Respondents invoke Rule 2:10-2 and waiver, but the orders challenged are central to the merits outcomes: early quash orders and later narrow discovery drove the factual record on which summary judgment issued. Given the dispositive impact, the restrictions were “capable of producing an unjust result” and should be vacated. R. 2:10-2.

POINT III Respondents’ substantive defenses—“errant” payment immateriality, “no escrow” absolutism, and abandonment/waiver—misstate the record and the summary-judgment posture.

1. The January 2020 payment from Savitz 2010’s account and the 2023 “reimbursement” are material to client identity, scope, and control—at minimum jury questions.

• The Schlaifer brief’s assertion that timing is “immaterial” is incompatible with Brill. Respondents themselves centered the reimbursement narrative, produced differing check images later explained by deposition, and relied on those explanations to argue overwhelming one-sidedness. ^{[28] [29]} That is a paradigmatic fact dispute for a jury; summary judgment was improper.

1. The “no escrow order” argument does not negate duties of safekeeping and non-interference with client/tribunal-directed property across counsel.

• Even accepting respondents’ cite that no formal order entered, counsel’s duties to avoid interference with client property and to honor litigation-driven safekeeping commitments remain trial questions on this record. Goldberg’s reliance on a narrow transcript snippet while ignoring other record indicia of safekeeping expectations, and while discovery into handling of funds/files was truncated, cannot support judgment as a matter of law. ^{[30] [31]}

1. Abandonment/waiver arguments fail; Appellants preserved and briefed the challenged rulings and claims, and respondents’ own briefs frame the core issues as preserved.

• The Schlaifer brief argues Appellants abandoned certain tort claims and Block’s individual claims. The reply focuses the Court on the dispositive errors: summary judgments and discovery curbs that tainted all claims. To the extent the Court restores the record and process, ancillary pleading/claim-scope issues should be addressed on remand.

POINT IV Record misstatements and extra-record assertions in respondents’ briefs highlight why reversal is required.

• Where respondents rely on “facts” outside the appendix record or over-read isolated transcript remarks to claim concessions, the Court should disregard such contentions and draw all reasonable inferences in Appellants’ favor, as Brill requires. To the extent respondents invoke arbitrator limitations from a separate matter to justify discovery bars here, those constraints do not govern this action and cannot be used both as shield (to block discovery) and sword (to claim absence of proof).

Conclusion

Appellants respectfully request that the Court:

1. a) Reverse the orders granting summary judgment to the Goldberg and Schlaifer defendants and remand for further proceedings;
2. b) Vacate the orders quashing Appellants’ subpoenas to nonparties and the orders limiting discovery to a single issue; and
3. c) Direct proportionate, case-appropriate discovery on client identity, scope of representation, safekeeping and control of client assets and files, and damages, with a reasonable schedule and without premature dispositive motion practice until core discovery is complete.

Respectfully submitted,

[Attorney Name] [Law Firm] [Address] [Phone] [Email]

Dated: [May 19, 2026]

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[1] The Trial Court held oral argument on the Schlaifer Defendants’ Motion on February 16, 2024. 4T. Following argument, the Trial Court granted the Schlaifer Defendants’ Motion and set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record as to each of Plaintiffs’ claims. 4T29:25-37:20. The Trial Court subsequently entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the Schlaifer Defendants on February 20, 2024. Pa552-Pa553., pg. 21, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[2] resolved with some additional, limited discovery on the issue of whether there was ever an attorney-client relationship between the Schlaifer Defendants and Savitz 2010 in connection with the January 7, 2020 errant payment from Savitz 2010 to Earp Cohn. Pa590., pg. 23, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

The Court subsequently proceeded with the October 9, 2024 case management conference. 5T. During that conference, Plaintiffs requested that the Trial Court clarify whether discovery would proceed on all of Block P.C.’s claims since the September 20, 2024 order and Memorandum of Decision did not address those claims beyond attorney-client relationship issue. 5T7:22-8:4. After hearing from all counsel, the Trial Court opined that it would issue another order and written decision after reviewing the original February 20, 2024 order on the Schlaifer Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and the scope of Plaintiffs’ brief supporting their Motion for Reconsideration. 5T 16:9-22., pg. 23, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

After completing this process, the Trial Court issued a sua sponte order and Memorandum of Decision on October 17, 2024 that clarified its decision on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration. Pa591-Pa607. Therein, the Trial Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ Motion was granted in part and denied in part. Pa591- Pa592. The Trial Court opined that the February 20, 2024 order was vacated on the issue of Block P.C.’s claim that the Schlaifer Defendants represented Savitz 2010. Pa592. The Trial Court further explained that the February 20, 2024, pg. 23, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

FILED, Clerk of the Appellate Division, April 21, 2026, A-003646-24, AMENDED, pg. 24, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

order was upheld as to 1) Block P.C.’s claim that the Schlaifer Defendants were not counsel for Savitz 2010 but still owed it and Block an independent duty, and 2) Block’s UFTA claim. Ibid., pg. 24, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[3] FILED, Clerk of the Appellate Division, April 21, 2026, A-003646-24, AMENDED, pg. 49, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

of Decision, the Trial Court set forth the procedural and factual history available at that time, as well as an analysis of those facts to the law governing the claims for which Plaintiffs sought reconsideration. Pa578-607. Through this process, it became clear to the Court this this case is fundamentally “a legal malpractice case.” Pa578, Pa593. Since the existence of an attorney-client relationship is an essential element of a legal malpractice claim and the Schlaifer Defendants had directly raised the issue as to whether said relationship ever existed with Savitz 2010, the most efficient and cost-effective way for the parties and the Court to resolve the entire claim was to conduct a period of discovery solely on that issue. That is precisely what the Court ordered. Pa590, 605., pg. 49, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

Plaintiffs contend that their due process rights were violated because Block P.C. was denied the opportunity to conduct discovery on its claims. Pb26- 27. Nothing could be further from the truth. Block P.C. was given every opportunity to obtain evidence during the discovery period ordered, and later extended, by the Trial Court. Block P.C. could have deposed a number of witnesses, including, but not limited to, Savitz, Byck, Friedman, Goldberg, Schlaifer, and other employees or representatives of Earp Cohn, to try and adduce facts related to the attorney-client relationship issue. It also could have served supplemental expert reports or issued appropriately tailored subpoenas., pg. 49, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[4] Nonparty Larry Byck was served with the Subpoena issued by the Plaintiffs (IA17) in his capacity as a representative of Allen F. Savitz Esquire, LLC “(Savitz 2010)”the motion filed on behalf of Larry Byck sought to quash the subpoena as it sought financial information and documentation that Larry Byck asserted was not relevant to the instant legal malpractice claim and was an attempt to obtain documentation that Michael Galpern, the arbitrator/mediator, already determined either did not have to be disclosed or was already produced. (Ia21-28)., pg. 10, 20260420_Inteervenor Brief byck.PDF

Notwithstanding the comprehensive Brief and Appendix filed by the Plaintiffs in this Appeal, the Plaintiffs make no specific reference to any error committed by the Trial Court in granting the Motion to Quash. The Plaintiffs’ Brief makes general and broad arguments that the Court erred or somehow erred in limiting discovery but, again, does not specifically, at all, indicate that the lower court erred in the granting of the Motion to Quash the Subpoena. This fact will be addressed in the legal argument set forth below., pg. 10, 20260420_Inteervenor Brief byck.PDF

[5] matter involved in the pending action.” Lipsky v. New Jersey Association of Health Plans, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 477, 464 (App. Div. 2023). Here, the Subpoena sought financial information related to entities that were not parties to the legal malpractice claim. Further, the Subpoena sought documentation that the arbitrator/mediator, Michael Galpern, previously determined was not appropriate (Ia20-28)., pg. 14, 20260420_Inteervenor Brief byck.PDF

As this Court has recognized, heightened scrutiny applies where, as here, the Subpoena is directed to a nonparty. In Re Subpoena Duces Tecum on Custodian of Records, Criminal Division Manager, Morris County, 214 N.J. 147 (2013). Significantly, this Court has instructed that when “the interest of a nonparty” is involved, the discovery request “deserves close scrutiny.” Trenton Renewable Power, Id. at 228. This heighted scrutiny requires the Court to balance factors such as relevance, the need for the documents, the breadth of the request and the burden imposed. Id. at 229. Even under otherwise liberal discovery standards, requests must remain tethered to relevance, as parties may only obtain discovery related to the subject matter of the accident. Lipsky Id. at 464., pg. 14, 20260420_Inteervenor Brief byck.PDF

Heightened scrutiny applies where, as here, a Subpoena is directed to a nonparty, and the Trial Court properly evaluated the Subpoena under that more exacting standard. Although discovery rules are generally reviewed under a, pg. 14, 20260420_Inteervenor Brief byck.PDF

[6] In his pursuit of these ends, this litigant is attempting to convince this Court that the Schlaifer Defendants had an attorney-client relationship with Savitz 2010 firm based solely on an administrative error: one check from January 2020 that was mistakenly issued from Savitz 2010’s checkbook by the same bookkeeper who was handling invoice payments for both Savitz 2010 and Savitz 2019 during the transition period at issue. The payment satisfied an Earp Cohn invoice addressed to Savitz 2019 for services rendered in forming the new firm and was fully reimbursed in 2023 after the mistake was discovered., pg. 10, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

Plaintiffs’ contentions all ignore the overwhelming factual record that demonstrates the Schlaifer Defendants never represented Savitz 2010. Sworn certifications, documents, and deposition testimony show that the Schlaifer Defendants were retained by Savitz, Byck, and their new law partner, Marcia Stander Friedman, initially for the narrow purpose of forming Savitz 2019. This retention was memorialized in a written engagement letter that expressly defined the scope of representation and identified the clients. Additionally, the factual record contains no retainer agreement, no invoices, no legal advice, and no course of dealing demonstrating or even suggesting that the Schlaifer Defendants ever undertook to represent Savitz 2010., pg. 10, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

FILED, Clerk of the Appellate Division, April 21, 2026, A-003646-24, AMENDED, pg. 11, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[7] resolved with some additional, limited discovery on the issue of whether there was ever an attorney-client relationship between the Schlaifer Defendants and Savitz 2010 in connection with the January 7, 2020 errant payment from Savitz 2010 to Earp Cohn. Pa590., pg. 23, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

The Court subsequently proceeded with the October 9, 2024 case management conference. 5T. During that conference, Plaintiffs requested that the Trial Court clarify whether discovery would proceed on all of Block P.C.’s claims since the September 20, 2024 order and Memorandum of Decision did not address those claims beyond attorney-client relationship issue. 5T7:22-8:4. After hearing from all counsel, the Trial Court opined that it would issue another order and written decision after reviewing the original February 20, 2024 order on the Schlaifer Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and the scope of Plaintiffs’ brief supporting their Motion for Reconsideration. 5T 16:9-22., pg. 23, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

After completing this process, the Trial Court issued a sua sponte order and Memorandum of Decision on October 17, 2024 that clarified its decision on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration. Pa591-Pa607. Therein, the Trial Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ Motion was granted in part and denied in part. Pa591- Pa592. The Trial Court opined that the February 20, 2024 order was vacated on the issue of Block P.C.’s claim that the Schlaifer Defendants represented Savitz 2010. Pa592. The Trial Court further explained that the February 20, 2024, pg. 23, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[8] Moreover, Harvey concedes in her own report that further discovery is needed on that issue, which is exactly what the Trial Court ordered in this case. As outlined at length above, the discovery in this case overwhelmingly demonstrates that no attorney-client relationship existed between the Schlaifer Defendants and Savitz 2010. Thus, the Harvey report could never create a genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice, negligence, or fiduciary duty claims. The Harvey report, as noted earlier, bases its entire conclusions upon the existence of the one errant check, and Plaintiff does not suggest how the opinion retains any validity or evidentiary value now that the evidence so thoroughly demonstrates, without material contradiction by any evidence, that it was simply an errant check from the joint bookkeeper.6, pg. 41, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

6 Of particular note, there was no revised or supplemental report from Harvey which in any way evaluated the evidence adduced during the discovery period on the threshold issue of whether Earp Cohn had ever represented Savitz 2010. The “expert” report concluded that an attorney-client relationship existed between Earp Cohn and Savitz 2010 based solely upon the errant check, a mere scintilla of evidence which has been soundly refuted by subsequent discovery, as found by the Trial Court., pg. 41, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[9] and Ms. Freeman. (Pa49). The Goldberg Defendants’ representation of Mr. Savitz, Mr. Byck, and AFS, LLC did not begin until almost a year later on June 8, 2020. (Pa188-190)., pg. 14, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

Plaintiffs also allege that the Goldberg Defendants violated the Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) and that their potential breaches of the RPC constitute negligent conduct, breach of fiduciary duty, and legal malpractice. (Pa63). On summary judgment, the trial court found that, while potentially evidence of these claims, violations of the RPC do not on their own create causes of action. (3T28-19-3T29-3). Accordingly, the court granted Summary Judgment as to all claims against the Goldberg Defendants. (Pa328-329)., pg. 14, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

[10] Throughout their brief, Plaintiffs alleges that the Goldberg Defendants may have violated the Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”)., pg. 45, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

The RPC set forth “the minimum standard of competence governing the [legal] profession.” Meisels v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 240 N.J. 286, 299 (2020) (quoting Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J. Super. 625, 634 (App. Div. 1986)). While potentially relevant in a civil case against attorneys, a violation of an RPC “standing alone . .. does not create a cause of action for damages in favor of a person allegedly aggrieved by that violation.” Id .; see also Sommers v. Mckinney, 287 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 1996) (“Violation of the rules of professional conduct do[es] not per se give rise to a cause of action in tort.”)., pg. 45, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

As established above, Plaintiffs cannot bring a claim against the Goldberg Defendants for legal malpractice because Plaintiffs are unable to establish a duty owed to them as discussed in Section I.B, supra. Therefore, there is not a viable legal malpractice claim regardless of any potential violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and any allegations of potential RPC violations are not relevant to the instant case., pg. 45, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

[11] resolved with some additional, limited discovery on the issue of whether there was ever an attorney-client relationship between the Schlaifer Defendants and Savitz 2010 in connection with the January 7, 2020 errant payment from Savitz 2010 to Earp Cohn. Pa590., pg. 23, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

The Court subsequently proceeded with the October 9, 2024 case management conference. 5T. During that conference, Plaintiffs requested that the Trial Court clarify whether discovery would proceed on all of Block P.C.’s claims since the September 20, 2024 order and Memorandum of Decision did not address those claims beyond attorney-client relationship issue. 5T7:22-8:4. After hearing from all counsel, the Trial Court opined that it would issue another order and written decision after reviewing the original February 20, 2024 order on the Schlaifer Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and the scope of Plaintiffs’ brief supporting their Motion for Reconsideration. 5T 16:9-22., pg. 23, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

After completing this process, the Trial Court issued a sua sponte order and Memorandum of Decision on October 17, 2024 that clarified its decision on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration. Pa591-Pa607. Therein, the Trial Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ Motion was granted in part and denied in part. Pa591- Pa592. The Trial Court opined that the February 20, 2024 order was vacated on the issue of Block P.C.’s claim that the Schlaifer Defendants represented Savitz 2010. Pa592. The Trial Court further explained that the February 20, 2024, pg. 23, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

FILED, Clerk of the Appellate Division, April 21, 2026, A-003646-24, AMENDED, pg. 24, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[12] from Judge Eastlack. There was no order from Judge Eastlack presented in the record below., pg. 19, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

Plaintiffs’ statement that Judge Eastlack “ordered” funds to be held in escrow is not corroborated by any evidence in the record. In fact, during oral argument of the Goldberg Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs admit that Judge Eastlack did not make an order to put money in a trust. (3T18-18-3T18-21). The appellate court is bound by the facts established by the trial record. See Estate of Hanges, 202 N.J. at 378 n.3. Therefore, there was no genuine issue of material fact for the court to consider on this issue that precluded summary judgment., pg. 19, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

[13] In addition, Ms. Harvey’s statement of facts includes multiple references to Judge Eastlack’s “directive,” which Goldberg Defendants allegedly violated. (Pa309, Pa312, Pa320). There is no evidence in the trial record of any directive from Judge Eastlack. Just as an appellate court is bound by the trial record, an expert is also bound by the factual record that would have been available to the trial court. Further, Plaintiffs conceded during oral argument on this issue that Judge Eastlack never made an order requiring the escrow of funds. (3T18-19-3T18-21). Plaintiff’s expert report directly conflicts with the trial court evidence, and therefore constitutes a net opinion., pg. 22, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

Further, Ms. Harvey opines in her report that the Goldberg Defendants could not represent the corporate defendant in the derivative action brought by DEB PC. (Pa302-308). In this section of her report, Ms. Harvey does not reference any New Jersey case law. (Pa303-308). None of the referenced case law is binding on New Jersey courts. Later in her report, Ms. Harvey relies on one New Jersey case, Schulman v. Wolff & Samson, PC, 401 N.J. Super. 467, pg. 22, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

[14] In addition, as the trial court found, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they suffered any damages from Goldbergs Defendants’ alleged malpractice. (3T29-4-3T29-8). Plaintiffs’ sole claim of damages as to the Goldberg Defendants is the money that Judge Eastlack allegedly ordered the Goldberg Defendants to hold in escrow. Plaintiffs admitted in their oral argument that Judge Eastlack did not make any order dictating the same. (3T18-19-3T18-21). Therefore, Plaintiffs also have no damages in their alleged legal malpractice claim against the Goldberg Defendants, and the court properly granted summary judgment against them., pg. 29, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

[15] After completing this process, the Trial Court issued a sua sponte order and Memorandum of Decision on October 17, 2024 that clarified its decision on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration. Pa591-Pa607. Therein, the Trial Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ Motion was granted in part and denied in part. Pa591- Pa592. The Trial Court opined that the February 20, 2024 order was vacated on the issue of Block P.C.’s claim that the Schlaifer Defendants represented Savitz 2010. Pa592. The Trial Court further explained that the February 20, 2024, pg. 23, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

FILED, Clerk of the Appellate Division, April 21, 2026, A-003646-24, AMENDED, pg. 24, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

order was upheld as to 1) Block P.C.’s claim that the Schlaifer Defendants were not counsel for Savitz 2010 but still owed it and Block an independent duty, and 2) Block’s UFTA claim. Ibid., pg. 24, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[16] The court ordered Plaintiffs to file a conforming response to the Goldberg Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment by November 17, 2023. (Pa227-228). Following their opposition filed on November 17, 2023, Plaintiffs submitted an untimely expert report from Christina Harvey, Esquire on November 28, 2023. (Pa297). Therefore, the court properly did not consider Ms. Harvey’s report and did not abuse its discretion determining to do so. However, even if Plaintiffs had produced Ms. Harvey’s report in a timely manner, the court correctly excluded the report as a net opinion., pg. 20, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

An expert may not provide an opinion at trial that constitutes mere net opinion. Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 410 (2014) (quoting Pomerantz, 207 N.J. at 372). The rule prohibiting net opinions is a corollary of New Jersey Rule of Evidence 703. See State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006). Rule 703 requires that an expert’s testimony “may be based on facts or data derived from (1) the expert’s personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts in forming opinions on the same subject.” Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. 1 on N.J.R.E. 703 (2014). The net, pg. 20, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

[17] In addition, Ms. Harvey’s statement of facts includes multiple references to Judge Eastlack’s “directive,” which Goldberg Defendants allegedly violated. (Pa309, Pa312, Pa320). There is no evidence in the trial record of any directive from Judge Eastlack. Just as an appellate court is bound by the trial record, an expert is also bound by the factual record that would have been available to the trial court. Further, Plaintiffs conceded during oral argument on this issue that Judge Eastlack never made an order requiring the escrow of funds. (3T18-19-3T18-21). Plaintiff’s expert report directly conflicts with the trial court evidence, and therefore constitutes a net opinion., pg. 22, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

[18] Plaintiffs also submitted expert reports from Douglas Cobb, Forensic Document Examiner (Pa442, Pa551). However, Mr. Cobb’s expert reports do not address any documents produced or signed by the Goldberg Defendants. (Pa442-446, Pa551). Therefore, these reports cannot create a genuine issue of material fact as to the summary judgment granted in favor of the Goldberg Defendants., pg. 23, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

[19] shareholders would be futile. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled a derivative claim on behalf of AFS, LLC., pg. 44, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment was properly granted as to the derivative claims against the Goldberg Defendants., pg. 44, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

[20] Plaintiffs-Appellants repeatedly argue and/or suggest at different points in their brief that the Trial Court ignored the “expert reports” from Harvey and Cobb in rendering its decision on their legal malpractice claim. Pb32-33, 36, 40-42. However, these reports are not competent evidence on a summary judgment record because they are classic examples of net opinions., pg. 39, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

FILED, Clerk of the Appellate Division, April 21, 2026, A-003646-24, AMENDED, pg. 40, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

Under New Jersey law, the “net opinion” rule “forbids the admission into evidence of an expert’s conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data.” State v. McGuigan, 478 N.J. Super. 284, 307 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1, 23 (2023)). For an expert’s opinion to be valid, the expert must “give the why and wherefore that supports the opinion, rather than a mere conclusion.” Weissman v. Li, 482 N.J. Super. 587, 600 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 54 (2015))(internal quotation marks omitted). New Jersey Courts are not permitted to rely on an expert’s opinion that “lacks an appropriate factual foundation and fails to establish the existence of any standard about which the expert testified.” McGuigan, 478 N.J. Super. at 308 (citing In re Civil Commitment of A. Y., 458 N.J. Super. 147, 169 (App. Div. 2019))., pg. 40, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

Here, Harvey’s report is unquestionably a net opinion. A review of the report shows that it does not conclude there was even an attorney-client relationship between the Schlaifer Defendants and Savitz 2010. In fact, the report lacks the standard governing the existence of an attorney-client relationship under New Jersey law and, instead, focuses on the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct and an analysis of whether Plaintiffs sufficiently pled their claims. Pa499-Pa527. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has already held that a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct cannot create a basis for, pg. 40, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

FILED, Clerk of the Appellate Division, April 21, 2026, A-003646-24, AMENDED, pg. 41, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

civil liability against an adversary’s attorney in this jurisdiction. See Baxt v. Liloia, 155 N.J. 190, 201 (1998) (“Neither the Appellate Division nor this Court has held, however, that the RPCs in themselves create a duty or that a violation of the RPCs, standing alone, can form the basis for a cause of action. We decline to do so today.”)., pg. 41, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

Moreover, Harvey concedes in her own report that further discovery is needed on that issue, which is exactly what the Trial Court ordered in this case. As outlined at length above, the discovery in this case overwhelmingly demonstrates that no attorney-client relationship existed between the Schlaifer Defendants and Savitz 2010. Thus, the Harvey report could never create a genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice, negligence, or fiduciary duty claims. The Harvey report, as noted earlier, bases its entire conclusions upon the existence of the one errant check, and Plaintiff does not suggest how the opinion retains any validity or evidentiary value now that the evidence so thoroughly demonstrates, without material contradiction by any evidence, that it was simply an errant check from the joint bookkeeper.6, pg. 41, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[21] conclusions of law in its decisions as required by Rule 1:7-4(a). This Rule states that trial courts “shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury, on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of right.” R. 1:7-4(a)., pg. 45, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

Yet, in support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite the exact portion of the transcript for the June 11, 2025 summary judgment hearing where the Trial Court set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law at length. Ibid. One need only read the transcript to conclude that the Trial Court appropriately set forth the procedural history of the case, its finding of facts based on the submissions of the parties, its analysis of those facts, and its application of those facts to the legal standard governing summary judgment applications. 7T16:10- 29:15. Tellingly, the Trial Court concluded the hearing with the following statement: “the Court finds that the evidence is overwhelmingly one-sided, that there was never, ever, ever any representation by Schlaifer or Earp Cohn of Savitz 2010 or Block. No reasonable juror or jury could conclude that there was a representation . .. The Court, having made that finding, the Court [is] … compelled to grant the motion for summary judgment.” 7T29:5-13. Thus, it is evident that the Court satisfied its obligation to set forth its conclusions of fact and law supporting its decision on the record., pg. 45, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[22] The Lower Court’s exercise of discretion is further supported by Serrano v. Underground Utilities Corp., 407 N.J. Super 253, 267 (App. Div. 2009), which confirms that Rule 4:10-3 allows a party from whom discovery is sought to obtain relief in appropriate circumstances. Similarly, in Trenton Renewable Power, Id. at 228, the Court reiterates that Protective Orders may be issued where necessary to prevent undue burden or oppression. Although the Court denied the Protective Order (Ia72), it granted the Motion to Quash. The Court’s ruling furthers the principles that although discovery is generally construed liberally, it is not unlimited. Trenton Renewable Power, Id. at 229, further, parties may obtain discovery only if it is “relevant to the subject, pg. 13, 20260420_Inteervenor Brief byck.PDF

[23] As this Court has recognized, heightened scrutiny applies where, as here, the Subpoena is directed to a nonparty. In Re Subpoena Duces Tecum on Custodian of Records, Criminal Division Manager, Morris County, 214 N.J. 147 (2013). Significantly, this Court has instructed that when “the interest of a nonparty” is involved, the discovery request “deserves close scrutiny.” Trenton Renewable Power, Id. at 228. This heighted scrutiny requires the Court to balance factors such as relevance, the need for the documents, the breadth of the request and the burden imposed. Id. at 229. Even under otherwise liberal discovery standards, requests must remain tethered to relevance, as parties may only obtain discovery related to the subject matter of the accident. Lipsky Id. at 464., pg. 14, 20260420_Inteervenor Brief byck.PDF

[24] Moreover, the lower court determined that the timing of the Subpoena, being served even before any other party filed a responsive pleading, was inappropriate, and did not properly afford the other parties time to voice any objection they may have had to the issuance of the Subpoena., pg. 15, 20260420_Inteervenor Brief byck.PDF

[25] While those subpoenas were pending, the Schlaifer Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 4, 2024. Pa330-Pa331. In support of that motion, the Schlaifer Defendants attached an initial copy of the reimbursement check that was in their possession. Pa406. A review of the copy, pg. 19, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

Non-parties Savitz 2019 and Byck filed two Motions to Quash all the subpoenas. Da22- Da27, Da32-Da37. These Motions were subsequently withdrawn as moot after the Schlaifer Defendants were initially granted summary judgment on February 16, 2024. Da46., pg. 19, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

FILED, Clerk of the Appellate Division, April 21, 2026, A-003646-24, AMENDED, pg. 20, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

shows that the signature and memo lines appear to be covered by a paper attached by a paper clip. Ibid. The review also appears to show that Biondi’s signature and the purpose of the payment were written on top of the paper. Ibid., pg. 20, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[26] Six days later, on October 23, 2024, the Trial Court held another case management conference with the parties. Pa611. Following the conference, Trial Court subsequently entered an order on the same date setting forth deadlines for written discovery and depositions on the issue of whether there was an attorney-client relationship between the Schlaifer Defendants and Savitz 2010. Pa611-Pa612. The Trial Court also ordered the parties to appear for another case management conference on February 12, 2025. Pa612., pg. 24, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

Between October 23, 2025 and February 2025, Block P.C. issued written discovery requests and renewed its subpoena as to Savitz 2019 and Savitz for substantially the same financial records that it sought in its initial quashed subpoena to Savitz 2019 and Byck. Da68-Da83. Following motion practice, Block P.C. subsequently withdrew the subpoena. Da82-83. Beyond the written discovery requests and subpoenas, Block P.C. did not pursue any additional discovery on the attorney-client relationship issue. 7T8:8-12, 10:6-9. Block P.C. did not take the deposition of Schlaifer or anyone else from Earp Cohn, nor of Kudatzky (the attorney representing Savitz 2010 during the buyout, pg. 24, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[27] The Court then held another case management conference on February 12, 2025. Pa616. As a result of that case management conference, the Court issued a case management order that same date extending the deadline for depositions until April 1, 2025 and setting the deadline for dispositive motions to May 1, 2025. Pa616-Pa617. The Schlaifer Defendants’ counsel subsequently deposed Biondi on March 14, 2025. Pa683-Pa720. Block P.C.’s counsel did not depose Schlaifer, Friedman, or anyone else by the April 1, 2025 deadline and waited until nearly two weeks after the deposition deadline, April 16, 2025, to depose only Byck. Pa637-Pa675., pg. 25, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[28] On April 29, 2025, the Schlaifer Defendants filed their second Motion for Summary Judgment. Pa620-Pa621. In support of this Motion, the Schlaifer Defendants attached another copy of the August 12 reimbursement check from Savitz 2019 to Savitz 2010 that was introduced as exhibits during Biondi and Byck’s depositions. Pa725. A review of this second copy shows that it is devoid of the paper covering that appeared on the first copy of the reimbursement check. Ibid., pg. 25, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

In further support of the Motion, the Schlaifer Defendants also annexed the transcript from Biondi’s deposition where she explained the reason for the, pg. 25, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

FILED, Clerk of the Appellate Division, April 21, 2026, A-003646-24, AMENDED, pg. 26, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

paper covering that appears on the initial copy of the reimbursement check. Pa683-Pa720. Specifically, Biondi testified at her deposition that the photocopy machine at the office where she worked had a security feature that prohibited a user from copying a check with a signature line. Pa714. Biondi further explained that as a result of this security feature, her practice was to photocopy a check by covering the bottom part of the check with her signature and then writing what the check was for on the copy after it was photocopied. Ibid., pg. 26, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[29] On June 11, 2025, the Trial Court held oral argument on the Schlaifer Defendants’ Motion. 7T. After hearing arguments from counsel for all remaining parties, the Trial Court issued its finding of facts and conclusions of law comprehensively on the record. 7T16:10-29:15. The Trial Court found that the evidence demonstrated that the one Savitz 2010 check payable to Earp Cohn was issued in error, concluded that the overwhelming evidence demonstrated there was no attorney-client relationship between the Schlaifer Defendants and, pg. 26, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

FILED, Clerk of the Appellate Division, April 21, 2026, A-003646-24, AMENDED, pg. 27, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

Savitz 2010, and granted summary judgment in favor of the Schlaifer Defendants. 7T29:11-15. The Trial Court’s decision was subsequently memorialized in an order that was entered on the same date as oral argument. Pa811-Pa812., pg. 27, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

STANDARD OF REVIEW, pg. 27, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

2. 2:10-2 provides: “Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but the appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court.” R. 2:10-2., pg. 27, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

The proper standard of review by the Appellate Division of a grant of summary judgment is de novo. Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (citing Mem’l Props., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 210 N.J. 512, 524 (2012)). In reviewing summary judgment orders, “the propriety of the trial court’s order is a legal, not a factual, question. See, Fernandez v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 402 N.J. Super. 166, 170 (App. Div. 2008), aff’d o.b., 199 N.J. 591 (2009) (citing Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment R. 2:10-2 (Gann)). Thus, the appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court in respect to the same motion records. See Templo, 224 N.J. at 199. That standard is”whether the evidence presents a, pg. 27, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

FILED, Clerk of the Appellate Division, April 21, 2026, A-003646-24, AMENDED, pg. 28, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one- sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” C.W. v. Cooper Health Sys., 388 N.J. Super. 42, 57 (App. Div. 2006). It is, in effect, a sufficiency of the evidence test. See Winstock v. Galasso, 430 N.J. Super. 391, 395-396 (App. Div.), certif. den. 215 N.J. 487 (2013) (quoting Alfano v. Schaud, 429 N.J. Super. 469, 475 (App. Div. 2013)) (noting that it is “not required to accept, as competent evidence, a purely self-serving certification by [a] plaintiff that directly contradicts his [or her] prior representations in an effort to create an issue of fact, which his [or her] testimony had eliminated.”). Consequently, an appellate court must consider the correctness of the decision below on the basis of the case only as it had unfolded to the point of the motion, and the evidential material submitted on that motion. See Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 542 (2011)., pg. 28, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

Additionally, the appropriate standard of review for decisions by the trial court limiting discovery is abuse of discretion. Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011) (citing Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411 (2006)). Under this standard, the appellate courts will “defer to a trial court’s disposition of discovery matters unless the court has abused its discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law.” Ibid. (quoting Rivers v. LSC P’ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 80 (App. Div. 2005)). An, pg. 28, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

FILED, Clerk of the Appellate Division, April 21, 2026, A-003646-24, AMENDED, pg. 29, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

abuse of discretion only occurs when “when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.” Davis v. Disability Rights New Jersey, 475 N.J. Super. 122, 141 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002))., pg. 29, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

LEGAL ARGUMENT, pg. 29, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

1. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY, pg. 29, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

JUDGMENT BECAUSE NO ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP EVER EXISTED BETWEEN THE SCHLAIFER DEFENDANTS AND SAVITZ 2010., pg. 29, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

The Trial Court in this matter correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Schlaifer Defendants because the evidentiary record is overwhelmingly one-sided and does not support Plaintiffs’ claims as a matter of law. The undisputed facts demonstrate that no attorney-client relationship ever existed between the Schlaifer Defendants and Savitz 2010. There was no retainer agreement, no invoices, no provision of legal advice, and no conduct from which such a relationship could reasonably be inferred. Crucially, the court concluded that the lone scintilla of evidence upon which Block’s claim was based was a clearly errant payment issued to Earp Cohn from Savitz 2010’s checkbook (by the same bookkeeper handling Savitz 2019’s books) in January 2020, which was reimbursed by Savitz 2019 after the principals became aware of its existence., pg. 29, 20260421_Filed Brief and Appendix of Schaifer.PDF

[30] from Judge Eastlack. There was no order from Judge Eastlack presented in the record below., pg. 19, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

Plaintiffs’ statement that Judge Eastlack “ordered” funds to be held in escrow is not corroborated by any evidence in the record. In fact, during oral argument of the Goldberg Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs admit that Judge Eastlack did not make an order to put money in a trust. (3T18-18-3T18-21). The appellate court is bound by the facts established by the trial record. See Estate of Hanges, 202 N.J. at 378 n.3. Therefore, there was no genuine issue of material fact for the court to consider on this issue that precluded summary judgment., pg. 19, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

[31] 4913-1436-7877, v. 1, pg. 33, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

FILED, Clerk of the Appellate Division, April 20, 2026, A-003646-24, AMENDED, pg. 34, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

Autoshred, LLC, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 180, *4-5 (App. Div. 2024) (citing Nieder v. Royal Indemnity Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)). “Relief under the plain error rule, R. 2:10-2, at least in civil cases, is discretionary and ’should be sparingly employed.”” Baker v. Nat’l State Bank, 161 N.J. 220, 226 (1999) (quoting Ford v. Reichert, 23 N.J. 429, 435 (1957)). Rule 2:10-2 mandates the appellate court to disregard any error or omission by the trial court unless “it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2. “The mere possibility of error is insufficient for reversal.” N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. V. N.S., 412 N.J. Super. 593, 622 (App Div. 2010). The court “must determine whether, in the interests of justice, the cited error had the ’clear capacity for producing an unjust result.”” Id. (quoting Tartaglia v. UBS Paine Webber, Inc., 197 N.J. 81, 128 (2008))., pg. 34, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

Plaintiffs argue for the first time on appeal that the trial court’s discovery orders limited their ability to prove a foundation for a legal malpractice claim against the Goldberg Defendants. Since the issue is neither jurisdictional nor implicates a public interest, the appellate court should only consider this issue if it constituted plain error., pg. 34, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

The trial court did not commit a plain error by limiting any discovery prior to the grant of summary judgment as to the Goldberg Defendants. The trial court made no discovery orders prior to the grant of summary judgment as, pg. 34, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

4913-1436-7877, v. 1, pg. 34, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

FILED, Clerk of the Appellate Division, April 20, 2026, A-003646-24, AMENDED, pg. 35, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF

to the Goldberg Defendants, and therefore, properly relied on the trial record at that time to make its decision., pg. 35, 20260420_Filed Brief and Appendix of Goldberg.PDF